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RENEGOTIATING THE BARGAIN: AN ANALYSIS AND 
EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVES FOR REVISING THE 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION IN MARYLAND'S 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT 
Andrea Giampetro-Meyert 
Ann M. Balcerzakt 
Legal challenges to the exclusive remedy provision! of Maryland's 
Workers' Compensation Ace have burgeoned in recent years. 3 These 
challenges are not surprising given the increasing tension between the 
workers' compensation and tort systems.4 Additionally, the employer-
employee bargain upon which the original statutes were based is 
outdated.5 Workers' compensation statutes were created to provide 
workers with the certainty of some recovery for injuries suffered 
incidental to an increasingly industrialized workplace.6 In exchange, 
t Associate Professor of Law, Sellinger School of Business & Management, 
Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland. B.S.B.A., Bowling Green State Univer-
sity; J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary. 
t Partner, Balcerzak & Bartiett, Columbia, Maryland. B.A., M.S.W., Marywood 
College; J.D., Catholic University of America. 
1. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
2. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. §§ 9-101 to 9-1201 (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 101, §§ 1 to 102 (1985»). 
3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 503 
A.2d 708 (1986); Le v. Federated Dep't Stores, 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 
(1989), afl'd, 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991); Continental Casualty Co. v. 
Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387,449 A.2d 1176 (1982); Schatz v. York Steak House 
Sys., Inc., 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982). 
4. When legislators originally enacted workers' compensation statutes, they did 
so in the context of a legal environment that made it difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail under tort law. Today, it is easier for plaintiffs to prevail under tort 
law. It is both easier for plaintiffs to prove negligence and more difficult for 
defendants to prove common law defenses to liability. See Note, Exceptions 
to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1644-45 (1983) [hereinafter Exceptions). 
5. See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1644-45; see also Roger Snell, Comment, The 
Exclusive Remedy Provision of Michigan's Workers'Disability Compensation 
Act 63 U. DET. L. REv. 453 (1986). The author states that 
[i)ronically, the shift in tort law has caused the employer and employee 
to alter their positions. The employers who once felt that the act was 
unfair are presentiy its strongest advocates, while workers, who at 
first hailed the act as a blessing, today attempt to circumvent it in 
order to maximize their recoveries. 
[d. at 455-56. 
6. See Deborah A. Ballam, The Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Doctrine: A 
Threat to Workers' Rights Under State Employment Discrimination Statutes, 
27 AM. Bus. L.J. 95, 113 (1989). 
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employees gave up the right to pursue common law recovery against 
their employers.7 
A variety of factors have triggered doubts about the judiciousness 
of the workers' compensation exclusive remedy rule. The failure of 
federal8 and state9 agencies to effectively regulate workplace safety, 
the shift in our society from industrial to service oriented jobs,1O and 
the decline of unionism and its consequence of fewer safety watchdogs 
in the workplacell have all contributed to the current climate ques-
tioning the exclusive remedy rule. 
Employees have questioned the exclusive remedy rule after seeing 
courts twist the rule to encompass causes of action under the workers' 
compensation system that most would not consider normal incidents 
of employment. Employees raped by their supervisors,12 rendered 
sterile or impotent as a result of poor workplace safety, 13 grossly 
disfigured as a result of workplace accidents,14 or working, with their 
employers knowledge, in manifestly unsafe working environments IS 
are encountering courts which refuse to stray from the original 
bargain upon which workers' compensation statutes were created. 
Workers in these, and many more situations, are being held to their 
end of the bargain, thus denying them the possibility of common 
law recovery. 16 
7.- RICHARD P. GILBERT & ROBERT L. HUMPHREYS, JR., MARYLAND WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION HANDBOOK 282 (1988) [hereinafter MARYLAND HANDBOOK]. 
8. See generally Holly Metz, Death by Oversight, 17 STUDENT LAW. 12 (1988) 
("Because OSHA fails to protect workers, local D.A.'s are hauling employers 
into criminal court."). 
9. See generally WORK INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN MARYLAND (H. Epstein ed. 
1977) [hereinafter WORK INJURIES IN MARYLAND]. 
10. See Larry T. Adams, Changing Employment Patterns 0/ Organized Workers, 
108 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 25 (Feb. 1985). 
11. Id. 
12. See Schatz v. York Steak House Sys., Inc., 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 
(1982); see also Rathbun v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys, 377 N.W.2d 872 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985); Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C.), 
eert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979). 
13. See Jack Dittoe, Note, The Treatment 0/ Sexual Impairment Injuries Under 
Workers' Compensation Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1207, 1223, 1230 (1979). 
14. Nine states do not allow benefits for disfigurement. Twenty-eight other states 
limit benefits to injuries that affect employability. Exceptions, supra note 4, 
at 1643 n.12. Maryland does allow compensation for disfigurement even when 
earning capacity has not been affected. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has stated that "a disfigurement may constitute an economic loss in the sense 
of diminished power to produce, and it may be as much a part of the workman's 
loss as the loss of a limb." Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. 
Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 480, 50 A.2d 799, 802 (1947). 
15. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 503 
-A.2d 708 (1986); see supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text. 
16. Some commentators see the broad sweep of the exclusivity rule as distressing. 
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So dissatisfied is one state, California, that it has considered 
abolishing its traditional system in favor of an, innovative new ap-
proachY Most states, however, are considering only incremental 
rather than fundamental changes to their systems. Some courts, 
including Maryland's, are reconsidering the exclusive remedy provi-
sions of their state's workers' compensation statutes. IS Recently, in 
Federated Department Stores v. Le,19 the Court of Appeals of Mar-
yland held that an exception to Maryland's exclusivity provision 
permitted an employee to pursue a common law tort remedy against 
his employer for an intentional tort committed upon him by a fellow 
employee. 20 
Federated demonstrates the court's willingness to adjust the 
employer-employee bargain. This Article analyzes and evaluates al-
ternatives, including the alternative presented in Federated, for re-
vising Maryland's exclusive remedy provision. Also considered are 
alternatives other jurisdictions have utilized in order to renegotiate 
the bargain underlying the exclusive remedy rule. 
Part I explains the theoretical underpinnings of workers' com-
pensation statutes and their exclusive remedy provisions. Part II 
examines the primary exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule in 
Maryland prior to Federated. This section focuses on the intentional 
tort exception in Maryland and the new interpretation of this excep-
See generally Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1656 (implying that workers are 
being "increasingly disadvantaged by a deal originally designed for their 
benefit"). 
Other commentators see this broad application of the exclusive remedy 
rule as necessary. See Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's 
Workers' Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REv. 
405, 411-16 (1988). King stresses several reasons that support a broadly based 
exclusive remedy principle. "First, subjecting employers to an increased threat 
of tort liability would undermine the carefully crafted compromise represented 
by the workers' compensation system." [d. at 411. "Second, the transaction 
costs of resolving workers' compensation cases are much less than for their 
tort counterparts." [d. at 412. Third, it would be oppressive to subject 
employers to both workers' compensation and tort liability claims. [d. at 412-
13. "Fourth, erosion of the exclusive remedy rule undermines the predictability 
of the workers' compensation system." [d. at 413. Fifth, the author is concerned 
about additional costs of litigating the threshold issue whether the exclusive 
remedy rule applies. [d. at 413. 
17. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text. 
18. Courts' present willingness to reconsider the exclusive remedy provisions of 
workers' compensation statutes is consistent with an earlier willingness to extend 
strict products liability theory beyond consumer products to ~rkplace prod-
ucts, thereby allowing workers to sue third party manufacturers of defective 
products. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1652. 
19. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). This decision affirmed the court of special 
appeals' decision, but used different reasoning. 
20. [d. 
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tion articulated by the court of appeals in Federated. Also explored 
are the meaning of "intent," the theory of alter ego in Maryland, 
and the common law concept of vicarious liability. 
Part III considers why courts and some state legislatures seem 
increasingly sympathetic to employee's arguments aimed at limiting 
the effects of the exclusive remedy rule. This section then explores 
Federated Department Stores v. Le in detail, including a comparison 
of the method by which the Court of Appeals of Maryland carved 
an exception to the exclusive remedy provision to methods other 
courts have utilized. This section clarifies the judicial alternatives for 
renegotiating the workers' compensation bargain. Finally, Part III 
considers legislative action that might be appropriate, summarizing 
the possible approaches Maryland could adopt in revising its workers' 
compensation law. 
Part IV outlines and evaluates the five major alternatives avail-
able to Maryland. This section also assesses the feasibility of each 
alternative in the context of a state legislature that is less than 
enthusiastic about renegotiating a bargain that would in any way 
provide more benefits to employees thereby raising employers' costS.21 
The Article concludes that Maryland should move toward protecting 
employees from unsafe work environments by adjusting the delicate 
balance between employer and employee rights. Maryland's courts 
and legislature should make this adjustment, but with full under-
standing of the implications of each of several alternatives. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In the nineteenth century, employees injured on the job could 
sue their employers at common law, but they typically lost.22 Courts 
required employees to prove fault on the employer's part, which was 
difficult.23 Those employees who were able to prove their employer's 
21. The issue of whether the legislature or the courts should renegotiate the bargain 
is important. Some courts believe that since the bargain was designed by the 
legislature, that they should not tamper with it. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 
1654 (citing, e.g., Kofron v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 441 A.2d 226, 231 (Del. 
1982}). Other courts believe they have an essential role in interpreting the limits. 
of the exclusive remedy rule. See Le v. Federated Dep't Stores, 80 Md. App. 
89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989), a/I'd, 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). Judicial 
action is important because legislatures tend to be slow. Additionally, politicians 
may be reluctant to make decisions that would benefit employees and thereby 
drive em~loyers to other states. 
22. Before st~tes adopted workers' compensation laws, approximately eighty percent 
of injured employees lost their cases against the employer for work-related 
injuries. See Snell, supra note 5, at 453 (citing S. HOROVITZ, CURRENT TRENDS 
IN BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 469 (1947». 
23. See Snell, supra note 5, at 453. 
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negligence still frequently lost because the employers were able to 
prove one of three available defenses - assumption of risk, contrib-
utory negligence and the fellow-servant rule.24 Employees who pre-
vailed in spite of the obstacles often enjoyed sparse awards because 
medical bills, attorney fees and other expenses were deducted there-
from.2s 
The industrial revolution brought with it an increased number 
of workers injured or killed on the job.26 Faced with workers who 
could not work to full capacity, and dependents of those workers 
needing financial support,27 states began to consider adopting work-
ers' compensation laws.28 
States considering workers' compensation laws keenly examined 
approaches adopted by European legislatures in the late nineteenth 
century. American lawmakers paid particular attention to British and 
German approaches to workers' compensation, determining that the 
statutes adopted by those countries effectively promoted safety with-
out compromising industrial progress.29 
Maryland became the first state in the nation to adopt a workers' 
compensation program when, in 1902, its legislature established an 
. "Employers and Employees Cooperative Insurance Fund."30 The 
fund benefitted employees, but it was both complicated and limited 
in coverage.3l By 1911, twenty-five states had enacted workers' com-
pensation statutes,32 offering employees an alternative to the prob-
lematic avenue of pursuing common law remedies for injuries. 
Today, workers' compensation laws throughout the United States 
vary regarding specific provisions,33 but consistently promote two 
24. See id. Because these common law theories typically precluded recovery against 
the employer, the employee's legal recovery was usually limited to proceeding 
against a co-worker who may have caused the accident. Co-workers typically 
had little money, so as a practical matter injured employees had no remedy 
available to them. 
25. [d.; see MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
26. See MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 14. 
27. See id. 
28. [d. Alternatives to workers' compensation existed: injured workers could be-
come beggars or states could have provided welfare to injured employees and 
their dependents. [d. at 14-15. 
29. See id. at .15-16. 
30. [d. at 16. 
31. [d. The Act benefitted employees who worked in private transportation, quarry 
and mining operations, and municipal or private construction contract work. 
The law was repealed in less than two years because of the nominal amount 
of its coverage, its application to only death cases, and its inherent complexity. 
[d. 
32. [d. 
33. See generally COMPENDIUM ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION (Nat'l Comm'n on 
State Workmen's Compensation Laws ed., 1973); U.S. ClIAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 1982 (1982). 
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primary goals. First, workers' compensation statutes aim to benefit 
employees accidently injured on the job by providing immediate 
compensation for lost wages, medical expenses, and rehabilitation 
services without requiring employees to prove employer fault. 34 Sec-
ond, the statutes aim to benefit employers by providing them with 
immunity from negligence-based civil lawsuits. 35 This delicate balance 
between employer and employee rights is reflected in a key provision 
in every workers' compensation statute - the exclusive remedy 
provision. 
The exclusive remedy principle in workers' compensation legis-
lation provides that an employee's only remedy for injuries suffered 
on the job is through the workers' compensation system.36 Injured 
employees may not pursue civil claims against their employersY 
34. See, e.g., Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 412 A.2d 733 (1980); Bethlehem-
Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 50 A.2d 799 (1947). 
35. See, e.g., Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 520 A.2d 717 (1987); 
Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 631, 519 A.2d 743 (1987), rev'd, 
324 Md. 617, 552 A.2d 889 (1989); Wood v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 260 
Md. 651, 273 A.2d 125 (1971). 
36. Ballam, supra note 6, at 96 n.2. Maryland's exclusive remedy provision outlines 
duties of employees and specifies those injuries not included. MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(a) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 
(1985»). Section 9-501 of the Act details the scope of coverage: 
(a) In general.-Except as otherwise provided, each employer of a 
covered employee shall provide compensation in accordance with this 
title to: 
(1) the covered employee for an accidental personal injury sus-
tained by the covered employee;· or 
(2) the dependents of the covered employee for death of the 
covered employee: 
(i) resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by 
the covered employee; and 
(ii) occurring within 7 years after the date of the accidental 
personal injury. 
(b) Employer liable regardless oj jault.-An employer is liable to 
provide compensation in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, 
regardless of fault as to a cause of the accidental personal injury. 
Id. § 9-501. 
Section 9-509 sets out the exclusiveness of remedy: 
(a) Employers.-Except as otherwise provided in this title, the liability 
of an employer under this title is exclusive. 
(b) Covered employees and dependents.-Except as otherwise provided 
in this title, the compensation provided under this title to a covered 
employee or the dependents of a covered employee is in place of any 
right of action against any person. 
Id. § 9-509(a). 
37. See, e.g., Flood v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 
(1963); Cox v. Sandler's, Inc., 209 Md. 193, 120 A.2d 674 (1956); Hart v. 
Sealtest, Inc., 186 Md. 183, 46 A.2d 293 (1946); Baltimore Transit Co. v. 
State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944). 
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Several courts, including Maryland's, have interpreted this exclusive 
remedy provision broadly. As a result, workers have foregone the 
right to sue at common law for nearly all claims, even those claims 
for which no remedy is available under the workers' compensation 
system.38 Some limited exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule do 
exist. The next section outlines Maryland's exceptions. 
II. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY RULE IN 
MARYLAND PRIOR TO FEDERATED DEPARTMENT 
STORES v. LE 
State statutes vary in the manner in which they outline exceptions 
to the exclusivity principle. 39 In Maryland, the legislature has outlined 
38. Ballam, supra note 6, at 108; see also Jean C. Love, Punishment and Deter-
rence: A Comparative Study oj Tort Liability Under No-Fault Compensation 
Legislation, 16 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 232, 244-45 (1981); e.g., Lawrence v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 627 P.2d 1168, 1168-70 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (holding 
that although the workers' compensation act does not provide compensation 
for employer's wanton conduct, act nonetheless bars common law remedies 
for same). See generally 2A ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION § 65.20 (1992) (discussing cases barring tort recovery for noncompensable 
injuries). 
39. As in Maryland, some states allow employees to sue under common law when 
the employer engages in intentional, willful, or deliberate employer misconduct. 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(d) (1991) provides that: 
(d) If a covered employee is injured or killed as the result of the 
deliberate intent of the employer to injure or kill the covered employee, 
the covered employee, or, in the case of death, a surviving spouse, 
child, or dependent of the covered employee may: 
(1) bring a claim for compensation under this title; or 
(2) bring an action for damages against the employer. 
[d. § 9-509(d); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022(A)-(C) (1983 & Supp. 
1991) (willful misconduct); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602(b) (West 1989) (willful 
physical assault); IDAHO CODE § 72-209(3) (1989) (willful or unprovoked physical 
aggression); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Baldwin 1986) (deliberate 
intention); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032(B) (West Supp. 1992) (intentional 
act); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281-A:8(I)(b) (Supp. 1991) (intentional torts); 
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Baldwin 1990) (intentional tort); OR. 
REv. STAT. §.656.156(2) (1979) (deliberate intention); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978) (intentional tort); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 
(1990) (deliberate intention); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (Supp. 1992) (deliberate 
intention). 
In other states, courts have provided common law remedies to employees. 
See, e.g., Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93-94 
(App. Div. 1949); Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 9 S.E.2d 35 (S.C. 1940). 
Finally, some states impose additional penalties on the employer in the 
form of a specified percentage increase in the employee's compensation award 
when the employer's misconduct was serious or willful, or when the employer 
violated safety statutes or orders. See Omo CONST. art. II, § 35 (15-50070 
penalty); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989) (50% penalty); Ky. REV. STAT. 
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two exceptions to this principle,40 and the courts, in turn, have 
interpreted these exceptions. This section focuses on how Maryland 
courts interpreted the exceptions prior to Federated Department 
Stores v. Le. 
A. Failure to Provide Insurance 
The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act states that liability 
under the Act is exclusive unless an employer should fail to secure 
the payment of compensation for injured employees and their de-
pendents as required by the statute, in which case the employees or 
their legal representatives may opt to pursue a common law remedy. 41 
B. The Intentional Tort Exception 
The Act states that employees can elect to pursue common law 
remedies or receive compensation under the workers' compensation 
system when the employee's injury or death results from the em-
ployer's intentional act.42 This provision of the Act has been the 
focus of extensive judicial interpretation. 
In Maryland, as in most states, the issue of whether an employ-
ee's injury arose out of intentional actions in the workplace is 
significant. Most employees would prefer to sue in tort rather than 
presenting a workers' compensation claim because of the possibility 
of a greater monetary award. Under workers' compensation, recovery 
is based on the goal of keeping workers from becoming burdens on 
the community, as compared to the goal of tort law, which is to 
restore plaintiffs to their former positions. 43 The only injuries usually 
compensated under workers' compensation are those that produce 
ANN. § 342.165 (Baldwin 1986) (15070 penalty); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
152, § 28 (West 1988) (100% penalty); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4) (Vernon 
Supp. 1992) (15% penalty); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10 (1978) (10% penalty); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1991) (10070 penalty); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-12 
(1988) (15% penalty); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West 1988) (15% penalty). 
40. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(c), (d) (1991). Section 9-509(d) provides 
an exception for intentionally inflicted injuries. Section 9-509(c) allows em-
ployees the option to accept workers' compensation or to sue under the common 
law when the "employer fails to secure compensation in accordance with this 
title." Id. § 9-509(c). 
41. See id. § 9-509(c); see also Kramer v. Globe Brewing Co., 175 Md. 461, 470, 
2 A.2d 634, 638 (1938) (explaining that "the right to sue the employer at 
common law is only inherent . . . in those cases in which the employer has 
failed to comply with [the Workmen's Compensation Act], in which latter case 
the employee . . . has the option of either claiming compensation under the 
Act, or maintaining an action at common law"). 
42. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(d) (1991). 
43. Leslie H. Kawaler, Note, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation 
Statutes: A Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 181, 185 (1983). 
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disability and thus affect earning power.44 Workers' compensation 
statutes typically grant the worker only one-half to two-thirds of his 
or her previous salary, with a maximum weekly recovery outlined by 
the state legislature.4s The issues of what is or is not intentional 
behavior, and whether the employer engaged in such behavior, are 
thus important mediating factors affecting the injured employee's 
potential recovery. 
Some states workers' compensation statutes, including Mary-
land's, specifically allow common law suits against employers who 
. commit intentional torts against an employee.46 Courts in several 
other states have interpreted their state statutes to allow common 
law recovery for intentional acts of employers that result in injuries 
to workers. 47 In the same vein, some states' statutes impose percentage 
penalties on the employer for employer misconduct resulting in 
additional compensation for injured employees.48 
The threshold issue of what constitutes an intentional act has 
been left to judicial interpretation. Specifically, courts in Maryland 
and throughout the country have focused on two major issues. First, 
courts have addressed the meaning of "intent." Second, courts have 
addressed the issue of whether an employer can be held responsible 
for an intentional act performed by someone other than the employer, 
such as a supervisor or co-employee. 
1. The Meaning of "Intent" 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted that "[eJven a dog 
distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked. "49 Sim-
ilarly, in the workers' compensation context, courts consider whether 
employees were "stumbled over" or "kicked" by their employers. 
Most courts agree that employers who engage in assault and battery 
upon their employees should not benefit from the limited liability 
provided under workers' compensation. Courts usually provide one 
of two rationales for this conclusion.so 
44.Id. 
45. Id. Additionally, workers can get lump sum payments for permanent partial 
disabilities, medical expenses, rehabilitation expenses, and death benefits when 
necessary. The amounts required to be paid to employees and dependents are 
provided in various sections of the Workers' Compensation Act. See, e.g., 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-678 to 9-686 (1991) (death benefit provi-
sions); id. §§ 9-625 to 9-632 (permanent disability provisions). 
46. See supra note 39. 
47.Id. 
48.Id. 
49. OLrvER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881). 
50. A third, less common . rationale is that an assault does not constitute a risk of 
the employment. Thus, this behavior falls outside the workers' compensation 
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The first rationale is based upon ethical considerations. 51 Courts52 
and commentators53 have provided numerous assertions similar to 
the following: "[A]n employer cannot correct and punish with whips 
the mistakes of his employees committed in the course of their 
employment, and protect himself against civil liability for the results 
of his assaults under the coverage of our Workmen's Compensation. 
ACt."54 
The second rationale for excluding intentional acts from workers' 
compensation coverage is that accidents, unlike intentional acts, are 
either unavoidable or occur through the employer's negligence. 55 
Intentional acts, however, do not happen without foresight or ex-
pectation,56 and are not accidents. Because of this distinction, inten-
tional torts should not be brought under the umbrella of a workers' 
compensation system that was created to deal specifically with neg-
ligent injuriesY 
act. This rationale has been criticized as being incompatible with the view that 
"even the most unforeseeable injuries resulting from risks which could never 
have been reasonably contemplated may still be compensable if the employment 
... exposed the employee to those risks." Joseph A. Page, The Exclusivity 
oj the Workmen's Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right to Sue His 
Employer in Tort, 4 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 555, 561 (1963). 
51. Id. at 560. 
52. See, e.g., Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 87 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (App. 
Div.), cert. denied, 89 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. 1949). 
53. See Kawaler, supra note 43, at 186. The author states that "[a] plaintiff should 
not be denied the amount of compensation which a court would find adequate 
simply because he was misfortunate enough to be employed by the one who 
intentionally caused his injury." Id. 
54. Page, supra note 50, at 560 (citing Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 
885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939»; see also SAMUEL B. HOROVITZ, INJURY AND 
DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 336 (1944) ("It would be 
against sound reason to allow the employer deliberately to batter his helper, 
and then compel the worker to accept moderate workmen's compensation 
benefits ... from his insurance carrier."). 
55. See Thomas D. Schroeder, Note, Workers' Compensation: Expanding the 
Intentional Tort Exception to Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Employer 
Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 890, 904 (1983). 
56. Id. at 905. 
57. See id. In Maryland, the issue of whether an injury arose from an "accident" 
has significance for a different reason. Maryland uses the term "accident" to 
limit employer liability. Maryland law provides recovery for the disability or 
death of an employee resulting from accidental personal injury sustained by 
the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment. MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-501(a) (1991). In other words, not all injuries arising 
out of and in the course of employment are compensable. Only accidental 
injuries are compensable. See, e.g., Rieger v. Washington Suburban Sanitation 
Comm'n, 211 Md. 214, 126 A.2d 598 (1956) (holding pipe fitter not entitled 
to compensation for injury resulting while pulling down on a wrench to tighten 
bolts since position was a normal incident of the work). 
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Despite strong reasons for refusing to allow employers to escape 
responsibility for intentional acts, courts are reluctant to declare acts 
other than direct assaults and batteries "intentional." Thus, the 
plaintiff who asserts that the employer's act was intentional, thereby 
exposing the employer to a common law tort suit, faces an extremely 
difficult task in proving intent unless he has suffered a direct assault 
or battery. Because the majority of plaintiffs who pursue this route 
lose, the plaintiff's safest choice is to seek recovery under the workers' 
compensation statute.58 
Some cases, such as where an employee can prove that an 
employer had an actual or specific intent to injure the employee, are 
clear.59 In Maryland, for instance, it is clear that employees may 
pursue common law remedies against employers who commit as-
saults.60 
Other cases are less clear. The threshold issue of what constitutes 
the "intent" necessary to bypass the exclusive remedy provision is 
the subject of intense debate. The minority position would allow 
common law recovery despite absence of actual intent by the employer 
For an injury to be accidental it must result from some unusual exertion 
or strain or some unusual condition in the employment. See, e.g., Sargent v. 
Board of Educ., 49 Md. App. 577, 433 A.2d 1209 (1981) (holding the annual 
cleaning of a boiler to be an extreme departure from routine duties); Whiting-
Turner Contracting Co. v. McLaughlin, 11 Md. App. 360, 274 A.2d 390 (1971) 
(holding that foreman's argument with a supervisor did not constitute an 
unusual strain or exertion on foreman's part); Commercial Transfer Co. v. 
Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967) (uprighting a 500 pound drum that 
tilted back onto truck driver found to be unusual exertion or strain); see also 
MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 75. 
58. See Kawaler, supra note 43, at 182. 
59. See, e.g., Wade v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 693 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982); Boek 
v. Wong Hing, 231 N.W. 233 (Minn. 1930). See generally 2A LARSON, supra 
note 38, § 68.11, at 13-14. Larson explains that courts have used different 
theories to allow common law recovery in this situation. Some courts state 
that assaults do not arise out of the employment relationship, thus they are 
not covered by workers' compensation. Other courts state that assaults are 
intentional and not accidental. Finally, some courts believe that the employment 
relationship is severed momentarily when an employer assaults an employee. 
Thus, the assault falls outside of the scope of workers' compensation. 
60. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(d) (1991); see also Johnson v. 
Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 255, 503 A.2d 708, 712 
(1986) (holding that complaint should be "based on allegations of an intentional 
or deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences 
of the act" in order for employee to bypass the exclusivity provision of the 
workers' compensation statute); see also Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co., 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 (1985) (extending intentional tort exception 
to common law claims against workers' compensation insurer for the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress committed on a claimant when the 
complaint alleges an injury resulting from the deliberate intention of the insurer 
to produce such injury). 
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to injure the employee if the "employer proceeded with a certain 
course of action even though it knew, or should have known, that 
harm to its employees was substantially certain to occur. "61 This 
standard allows employees to pursue common law actions against 
the grossly negligent or reckless employer. 62 
The majority of states are more cautious and unwilling to narrow 
the scope of workers' compensation.63 Thus, most courts find an 
intentional tort only when the employer had a specific or actual 
intent to injure an employee. Following the majority rule, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held in Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of 
Delmarva, Inc.,64 that the exclusivity rule of Maryland's Workers' 
Compensation Act does not permit an employee to pursue a common 
law action against an employer for accidental injuries caused by 
gross, wanton, willful, or reckless negligence of the employer, except 
when such injury is intentional. 65 The case, a wrongful death and 
survivorship action against an employer, focused on the claim of the 
mother of a deceased sixteen year old who died by electrocution 
while using a sump pump to remove liquid chicken fat and water 
from a ground depression.66 
The suit alleged that the employer's failure to warn of dangerous 
electrical lines or to provide safe conditions effectively placed the 
employee in a deliberately dangerous position.67 Additionally, the suit 
alleged that the employer had willfully violated government regula-
tions. 68 Approximately two months before the electrocution, the 
Maryland Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MOSHA) 
had cited the company for a "serious violation,"69 focusing on several 
defective and dangerous parts of the sump pump's electrical connec-
61. Ballam, supra note 6, at 112. 
62. See id. Most jurisdictions have rejected this approach because they fear that 
the exclusive remedy provision would become easier to avoid, thus jeopardizing 
the workers' compensation system. See generally 2A LARSON, supra note 38, 
§ 68.15, at 13-58. 
63. See Schroeder, supra note 55, at 897. 
64. 305 Md. 246, 503 A.2d 708 (1986). 
65. [d. at 253, 503 A.2d at 711-12. This position is inconsistent with the following 
assertion by a workers' compensation scholar: 
An employer who knows for a fact that if certain conditions are 
allowed to exist or if certain changes are put into effect, harm will 
befall a particular employee or anyone of a group of employees, is 
certainly not far removed, in terms of moral blameworthiness, from 
the boss who "clobbers" a worker with a baseball bat. 
Page, supra note 50, at 564. 
66. Johnson, 305 Md. at 248, 503 A.2d at 709. 
67. [d. at 255, 503 A.2d at 712. 
68. [d. 
69. [d. at 248, 503 A.2d at 709. 
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tions.70 After the citations were issued, Mountaire informed MOSHA 
that it had corrected the violation when in fact it had not.71 
In Johnson, the court of appeals rejected a minority rule that 
broadened the "intent" definition72 and held that the employer's 
behavior did not constitute an intentional tort for the purposes of 
overcoming the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation 
Act. 73 The court stated that to bypass the exclusivity provided by the 
workmen's compensation statute, the complaint must allege an in-
tentional or deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring 
about the consequences of the act. 74 The court further stated that 
"[a]n employer has acted with 'deliberate intention' only when the 
employer has determined to injure an employee or employees within 
the same class and used some means to accomplish this goal. "75 
In sum, the meaning of "intent" in Maryland is reserved for 
specific and rare situations. It is difficult to find a scenario outside 
actual assault and battery by the employer that would qualify as 
"intentional," and thus allow employees to pursue common law 
remedies rather than seek the remedy provided by the workers' 
compensation system. Thus, although the Act appears to give em-
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
72. The minority rule that broadened the intent definition was established by Ohio 
and West Virginia courts. In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 
433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982), the Supreme Court 
of Ohio ruled in favor of employees who sought to avoid the exclusivity 
principle when they alleged that their employer failed to warn them of the 
dangers associated with toxic chemicals. The employees were successful in their 
argument that this behavior was intentional, malicious, and in wanton disregard 
for their health and safety. 
In Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), the 
Supreme Court of West Virginia ruled in favor of an employee who lost a 
portion of his hand while operating a table saw. The employer had removed 
a safety shielding device after a safety inspector had "tagged" the equipment 
and prohibited the saw's use without the shield. The employer had allegedly 
required the plaintiff to operate the saw. The court held that employees may 
pursue common law actions when their employer's willful, wanton, or reckless 
misconduct results in death or injury. 
The legislatures of both Ohio and West Virginia overruled their courts' 
decisions. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (Baldwin 1990); W. VA. CODE 
§ 23-4-2 (1992). 
73. Johnson v. Mountaire Farms of Delmarva, Inc., 305 Md. 246, 255, 503 A.2d 
708, 712 (1986). 
74. [d . . Some commentators have pointed out that employers who engage in 
behavior similar to the employer's conduct in Johnson are attempting to 
maximize productivity, not to inflict injury. See Edward J. O'Connell, Jr., 
Note, Intentional Employer Misconduct and Pennsylvania's Exclusive Remedy 
Rule After Poyser v. Newman & Co.: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 49 
U. PITT. L. REv. 1127, 1146 (1988). 
75. Johnson, 305 Md. at 258, 503 A.2d at 714. 
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ployees the option of electing to sue civilly in the intentional tort 
situation, it is rare that employees can successfully exercise this 
option. 
2. The Alter Ego Issue and the Employer's Liability for 
Intentional Acts of Co-Workers 
Where an employee incurs an injury as the result of an employ-
ers' intentional act, Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act allows 
an employee to make an election as to pressing a claim under the 
Act or in a common law tort suit against the employer. 76 The issue 
of an employers' liability for a worker injured by the intentional act 
of a co-worker is far less clear. Prior to Federated Department Stores 
v. Le,77 Maryland courts interpreted the Act to allow employees to 
sue their employers under the common law for intentional torts only 
if the employer or someone acting as the "alter ego" of the employer 
was the actual tort feasor . 78 
The seminal case addressing intentional acts of co-employees is 
Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.,19 a 1946 case in which a worker, 
Rice, was killed by a co-worker on the employer's premises for 
reasons unrelated to the workplace.80 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland framed the inquiry in Rice as whether the assault "arose 
out of the course of employment. "81 
Based on the evidence, the court held that the death did not 
arise "out of" Rice's employment and was therefore not compensable 
under workers' compensation. 82 The court identified three factors 
leading to its decision: (1) the fact that the attack was not due to a 
friction of personalities inseparable from the workplace; (2) the 
workplace did not enhance the opportunity for revenge; and (3) the 
bare fact that the workplace brought the parties together was not 
enough to show a nexus between the workplace and the injury.83 
In 1982 in Schatz v. York Steak House Systems, Inc.,84 the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland significantly departed from 
the Rice analysis. Schatz involved a waitress who was raped by her 
76. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP., § 9-509(d) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 101, § 44 (1985)]. 
77. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991), aff'g 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989). 
78. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176 
(1982) (discussed infra notes 93-101); Schatz v. York Steak House Sys., Inc., 
51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982) (discussed infra notes 84-92). 
79. 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166 (1946). 
80. Id. at 566, 48 A.2d at 167. 
81. Id. at 566-68, 48 A.2d at 167-69. 
82.Id. 
83. Id. at 568, 48 A.2d at 169. 
84. 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982). 
1991] Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Provision 65 
supervisor, an assistant manager, while assisting with preparations 
for the nightly closing.85 The employee received compensation bene-
fits, and filed a tort action against the employer for physical and 
psychological damages. 86 
The court reasoned that an employer's liability for an employee's 
intentional misconduct was limited to circumstances in which the 
employee acted as the "alter ego" of the employer. 87 Elaborating, 
the court stated that when the person who intentionally injures the 
employee is not "realistically the alter ego of the corporation, but 
merely a foreman, supervisor or manager," the employee is barred 
from bringing a damage action against the employer. 88 The court 
then found that the assistant manager was not the employer's alter 
ego, effectively denying the injured employee the opportunity to 
bring a common law tort action against her employer under the 
workers' compensation act's intentional tort exception. 89 
The court also rejected the employee's argument that since the 
incident did not arise "out of and in the course of employment," 
that it was therefore not addressed by the Workers' Compensation 
Act.90 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the provision for recovery 
under the Act by workers injured by third persons while in the course 
of employment91 does not include fellow employees as "third per-
sons." Without mentioning Rice, the court held that a fellow em-
ployee whose willful or negligent act caused injury to an employee 
in the course of his employment could be considered a "third person" 
under the Act. 92 Thus because the Act provided a basis for recovery, 
the plaintiff did not have the option of pursuing a common law 
remedy. 
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile,93 the court of special 
appeals clarified the Schatz'decision, thereby shedding more light on 
the alter ego issue. Mirabile involved an employee who sued his 
supervisors and employer for negligence, defamation, assault, battery, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy to interfere 
with contractual relations. 94 These charges stemmed from "a series 
85. [d. at 495, 444 A.2d at 1046. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. at 497, 444 A.2d at 1047. 
88. Id. (quoting 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.21, 
at 13: 10-11 (1976». 
89. [d. at 497-98, 444 A.2d at 1048. 
90. [d. at 497, 444 A.2d at 1047. 
91. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-101(b)(2) (1992) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 101, § 67(6) (1985»). 
92. Schatz, 51 Md. App. at 499, 444 A.2d at 1048. 
93. 52 Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176 (1982). 
94. [d. at 388, 449 A.2d at 1178. 
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of petty humiliations inflicted upon an extremely sensitive young 
man" by his co-workers.9s 
Relying on Schatz, the court held that the Workers' Compen-
sation Act provided the exclusive remedy as against the employer 
because the supervisors were not acting as the alter ego of the 
employer.96 Reaffirming that supervisors are not automatically the 
employer's alter ego, the court explained that it would consider an 
employee's rank, position, or status to determine whether the em-
ployee is the employer's alter ego.97 Specifically, the court stated that 
"[a]ttribution of employer liability for the actor's conduct should be 
based on identification rather than agency and is appropriate only 
where the actual tortfeasor is of such a rank or position that he may 
be deemed the alter ego of the employer.' '98 
The court stated that it would also consider whether the employer 
directed or authorized the assault.99 Upon the evidence presented, the 
court decided that the tortfeasor, a claims manager, was not the 
employer's alter ego, thus the Act's exclusivity provision barred the 
assault and battery count against the employer .100 The court reasoned 
that allowing a tort action against the employer for the intentional 
torts of an employee who was not the employer's alter ego would 
allow plaintiffs to recover merely by showing that the assailant was 
"one notch higher on the totem-pole than the victim."lol Thus, prior 
to Federated Department Stores v. Le,l02 it was extremely difficult 
for an employee in Maryland to avoid the exclusive remedy provision 
of the Workers' Compensation Act for intentional conduct exhibited 
by someone other than the employer .103 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 395-98, 449 A.2d at 1181-83. 
97. Id. at 396-97, 449 A.2d at 1182. 
98.Id. 
99. Id. at 398, 449 A.2d at 1183. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. (citing 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.21, 
at 13 (1976». Some commentators have indicated that allowing recovery outside 
of workers' compensation by showing that the supervisory employee is "one 
notch higher on the totem pole" would be problematic. In complex organiza-
tional structures, a foreman at the bottom of the hierarchy could subject the 
employer to liability without employer awareness. Liability would be determined 
by whether the tort feasor outranks the injured employee, rather than by whether 
the injury was work-related. Schroeder, supra note 55, at 899 (citing 2A A. 
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 68.21, at 13-34 (1976». 
However, this position insulates corporate employers from intentional actions 
brought by employees. Page, supra note 50, at 564. 
102. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991); see supra notes 143-180 and accompanying 
text. 
103. Plaintiffs elsewhere have, on occasion, been successful. See, e.g., Garcia v. 
Gusmack Restaurant Corp., 150 N.Y.S.2d 232 (City Ct. 1954) (denying defen-
1991] Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Provision 67 
3. Vicarious Liability 
An employee able to persuade the court that the tort feasor was 
the employer's alter ego, so as to permit the employee to pursue a 
common law remedy, might nonetheless have great difficulty pre-
vailing. Once the employee removes his claim from the Workers' 
Compensation Act pursuant to the intentional tort exception, then 
conventional tort law, 104 including the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, applies. lOS Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an em-
ployer is held, regardless of fault, vicariously liable for an employee's 
tortious conduct committed within the scope of the employee's job. I06 
Maryland courts have outlined the showing required to prevail 
in a suit sounding in respondeat superior. In Cox v. Prince George's 
County,lCJ7 the court of appeals noted first that "the tortious actor 
must be the servant or agent of the one sought to be held liable, 
that is, a master-servant or principal-agent relationship must exist. "108 
Once this is established, the plaintiff must "show that the offending 
conduct occurred within the scope of employment, or under the 
express or implied authorization of the master. "109 
dant's motion to limit employee's claim to workers' compensation where 
employee was assaulted by the president and operator of employer bar and 
grill); Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., Inc., 230 S.W.2d 28 (Ark. 
1950) (finding corporate liability triggered by an assault by a general manager). 
Of course, plaintiffs can sue their co-employees directly. See, e.g., Hutzell 
v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969) (allowing suit by co-employee 
passenger when co-employee driver fell asleep at the wheel and truck ran off 
the road). It is unlikely, however, that the co-employees have deep pockets. 
Additionally, plaintiffs could base a suit against the employer upon negligent 
hiring or supervision; however, as these claims are based on negligence, they 
are barred by the exclusivity rule. See, e.g., La Bonte v. National Gypsum 
Co., 269 A.2d 634 (N.H. 1970) (holding that exclusivity provisions of Workers' 
Compensation Statute barred husband who received injuries from assault and 
battery committed by co-worker from bringing suit against employer for 
negligence; but allowing wife to sue for loss of consortium); Durso v. Modern 
Biscuit Corp., 205 N.Y.S.2d 923 (App. Div. 1960) (holding that as award by 
Workmen's Compensation Board is binding determination that injuries received 
from fellow employee "arose out of and in the course of the employment," 
employee's sole remedy was under Workmen's Compensation Act). See gen-
erally Ralph L. Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of 
His Servants, 45 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1, 15 (1968) (discussing negligent hiring 
as alternative basis for suit). 
104. See Donald C. Massey, Comment, Intentional Torts in Workman's Compen-
sation Cases: Bazley v. Tortorich Revisited, 30 Loy. L. REv. 337, 357 (1984). 
105. See Brill, supra note 103, at 1. 
106. Id. 
107. 296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983). 
108. Id. at 165, 460 A.2d at 1039; see Brill, supra note 103, at 1; see also Drug 
Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 346, 283 A.2d 392, 395 (1971). 
109. Cox, 296 Md. at 165, 460 A.2d at 1039; see MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra 
note 7, at 92-93 (citing Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561, 48 
A.2d 166 (1946) (death of worker did not arise "out of" employment». 
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Courts have stated that a tort is committed in the scope of 
employment if the underlying action is necessary to achieve the 
purpose of the employment, occurs substantially within the authorized 
time and space limits of the workplace, and is intended to serve the 
purposes of the employer. llo Courts have also clarified the authority 
issue. A master's liability extends to 'intentional torts committed by 
a servant, whether or not the servant's act is authorized, if the act 
is done in connection with the servant's employment and is not 
unexpected in view of the servant's duties. 1Il 
An employee who could successfully prove the wrongful em-
ployee was the employer's "alter ego," therefore allowing a common 
law suit, would still face obstacles. For example, even if the tort feasor 
was the employer's "alter ego" and acted within the scope of 
employment, the act of intentionally injuring a fellow employee would 
seldom serve the purposes of the employerll2 or constitute expected. 
conduct in view of the duties of the servant. lI3 
Thus, for example, even if the employee who was raped by her 
supervisor in Schatz l14 had managed to avoid the exclusive remedy 
rule, she may have nonetheless lost at common law because the 
tort feasor was clearly neither serving his employer's purposes nor 
acting in an expected manner. The same may have been true of the 
plaintiff in Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile. lls 
In sum, the intentional tort exception in Maryland has histori-
cally been narrowly interpreted. Even if an employee managed to 
overcome the difficulty of avoiding the exclusive remedy provision, 
he or she still faced tremendous obstacles prevailing at common law. 
III. RENEGOTIA TING THE BARGAIN 
Employees believing their injuries to be undercompensated, ll6 
coupled with employers concerned over skyrocketing insurance prem-
110. Lewis v. Accelerated Transp.-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 255-56, 148 
A.2d 783, 785 (1959). 
111. Cox, 296 Md. at 171, 460 A.2d at 1042 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 245). 
112. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
113. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
114. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 93-101. In this case, it is doubtful that the 
employee's supervisor could be serving the employer or acting in an expected 
way when he allowed the plaintiffs co-workers to inflict humiliations upon the 
extremely sensitive plaintiff. 
116. See Snell, supra note 5, at 455 ("The benefits under workers' compensation 
have failed to keep pace with the rising cost of living. Workers also find 
themselves in the position of accepting predetermined limits on the amount of 
compensation they can receive for wage losses and medical expenses. The 
limitations rarely permit the worker to receive the statutory maximum allowable 
under the act. "). 
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iums,lI7 have fueled discussions about changing the workers' com-
pensation system. The judicial system and some state legislatures 
have increasingly faced the difficult task of addressing employee 
demands for relief, while maintaining the integrity of the workers' 
compensation system. This section examines some indicators that 
show the need to reassess the status of the workers' compensation 
system in light of its purpose and intent, and explores strategies to 
maintain the integrity of this system. 
A. Why Courts and Legislatures Are Reconsidering the Bargain 
Courts have dealt cautiously with the workers' compensation 
system because of the belief that any major readjustment should 
come from the legislature. liS Despite this caution, or perhaps because 
of it, judicial intervention has drawn into the workers' compensation 
system some types of claims that developed in other areas of the 
law. For example, some courts require state discrimination claims1l9 
that allege physical injuries to be brought under the workers' com-
pensation system.120 
117. See Roger Thompson, Fighting the High Costo! Workers' Comp, NATION'S 
Bus., Mar. 1990, at 20-28. 
118. See supra note 21. 
119. Federal discrimination claims could not be barred by state exclusivity law 
because doing so would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see also Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 
1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983). 
120. See Stimson v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 258 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(finding employee who suffered a nervous breakdown and lost her capacity to 
work precluded from bringing state discrimination action by the exclusivity 
rule of the workers' compensation statute); see also Moll v. Parkside Livonia 
Credit Union, 525 F. Supp. 786 (B.D. Mich. 1981) (finding employee who 
filed sex discrimination action precluded from recovering compensatory and 
punitive damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, but not precluded 
from recovering damages under the Equal Pay Act or from maintaining action 
for mental and physical damages under the Civil Rights Act, when those mental 
and physical damages did not result in disability); Schroeder v. Dayton Hudson 
Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (finding civil rights action for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from age and sex discrimi-
nation precluded). But see Luna v. City & County of Denver, 537 F. Supp. 
798 (D. Colo. 1982) (finding actions for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress without accompanying physical injury cognizable under Colorado law); 
Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (rejecting 
the Stimson holding); Sullivan v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 79 (B.D. Wis. 
1977) (finding workers' compensation statute did not include claims for injury 
by discrimination, mental distress or loss of employment); Jones v. Los Angeles 
Community College Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that 
exclusivity provision of Workers' Compensation Act did not preclude painter 
from recovering for injuries arising from racial discrimination in employment); 
Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 362 N.W.2d 642 (Mich. 1985) (finding 
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Even courts that adopt new ways around the exclusivity rule 
rarely acknowledge that the balance between employer and employee 
rights is out of kilter. Two factors that underlie the increased number 
of challenges to the system, however, suggest that the bargain between 
employees and employers needs adjustment. 12I 
First, the tension between the tort and workers' compensation 
systems is becoming increasingly obvious. 122 When originally enacted, 
workers' compensation statutes benefitted workers because the tort 
system, with its inherent difficulty of establishing the employer's 
fault, had left many workplace injuries uncompensated.123 It is now 
significantly easier for plaintiffs to prevail under the tort system and 
to receive substantial jury verdicts for pain and suffering, and, 
sometimes, punitive damages. Plaintiffs are better able to prove their 
tort claims because of the weakening of some common law de-
fenses,124 particularly the increasing acceptance of comparative rather 
than contributory negligence,125 and because of the development of 
the strict liability concept. 126 
The tension between the tort and workers' compensation systems 
has been exacerbated not only because employees would, if given the 
option, frequently be able to recover under the common law, but 
also because employees would receive a substantially greater monetary 
reward under the tort system than under the workers' compensation 
system. Some states have raised their workers' compensation benefit 
levels,127 but even these increases have failed to keep pace with the 
rising cost of living,l28 so that workers are rarely compensated to the 
full extent of their loss.129 
exclusive remedy provision of workers' compensation statutes does not ban 
employment discrimination claims); Reese v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 731 P.2d 
497 (Wash. 1987) (determining that the exclusive remedy principle does not 
preclude handicap discrimination claims). 
12l. See generally Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1648 (positing that workers com-
pensation system is inadequate both as a means of providing adequate relief 
to injured workers and as a mechanism for creating proper incentives for 
reduction of accidents and related costs). 
122. See Dittoe, supra note 13, at 1208-10; Page, supra note 50, at 556-57; 
Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1660-6l. 
123. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
124. See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1645. 
125. Maryland is one of the few states that still has contributory rather than 
comparative negligence as a defense. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 471 n.30 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 
1988). 
126. See Snell, supra note 5, at 455. 
127. See Thompson, supra note 117, at 22. 
128. Id. 
129. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1642. 
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The workers' compensation system is limited to medical and 
rehabilitation costs, and, usually, two-thirds of the workers' average 
weekly wage. 130 Furthermore, the prohibition of punitive damages 
and awards for pain and suffering under the workers' compensation 
system creates a disparity whereby a worker eligible for only a small 
recovery under the system could recover substantially more under 
the common law had the injury not occurred during the course of 
employment. 
When comparing the two alternatives, it is also important to 
note that those employed in industries that still enjoy the protection 
of unions, and those who live in states that have adopted exceptions 
to the employment-at-will doctrine (thereby making it less likely that 
they could be fired for suing their employer), can be more assertive 
in pursuing common law remedies.13I Also, more attorneys are avail-
able to help employees assert their rights. 132 Finally, some commen-
tators focus on administrative flaws in the workers' compensation 
system that prevent the speedy payments that were meant to offset 
the larger awards possible under the common law. 133 
The second major reason to reconsider the bargain between 
employer and employee rights is that in some cases employees' safety 
needs are not satisfied. Workers' compensation statutes were origi-
nally designed to promote safety, 134 increasing the level of workplace 
safety by placing the cost of workplace accidents on employers who 
pay insurance premiums.13s Employers desiring to lessen their prem-
iums thus had an incentive to maintain a safe workplace. 136 
Unfortunately, however, the system fails to impose the full cost 
of work-related accidents on employers. 137 Employees therefore suffer 
130. [d. 
131. [d. at 1645. For a discussion of the employment-at-will rule and the public 
policy exception in Maryland, see Gil A. Abramson & Stephen M. Silvestri, 
Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge in Maryland, 10 U. 
BALT. L. REv. 257, 259 (1981). . 
132. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1645. Some commentators believe the increase in 
the number of attorneys over the past seventy years hurts the process of 
compensating employees. See, e.g., King, supra note 16, at 411. 
133. Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1644 (citing POLICY GROUP OF THE INTERDEPART-
MENTAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: Is 
THERE A BETTER WAY? 19 (1977) (positing that problems of workers' compen-
sation are "due as much to the structure and management of the system as 
they are to the adequacy of benefits"». 
134. See id. at 1641. 
135. See id. at 1646. 
136. See generally Thompson, supra note 117. 
137. See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1646. The author explains that "[a]ttaining 
the socially optimal level of workplace safety requires that the amount of 
spending on safety measures be set so that it minimizes total accident cost." 
Furthermore, "[e]mployers are the appropriate party to bear accident costs, 
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in a two-fold manner that is antithetical to the original bargain: first 
they are not compensated fully under the workers' compensation 
system; second they often enjoy a less than safe work environment. 
As long as benefit levels remain low and the exclusive remedy rule 
remains intact, employers have inadequate incentives to increase the 
safety of working conditions. Additionally, recent budget cutbacks138 
and policy changes139 at state l40 and federaP41 regulatory agencies have 
increasingly left these agencies unable to effectively ensure a safe 
workplace. These two factors have led many courts, and some state 
legislatures, to consider renegotiating the bargain between employers 
and employees by revising exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule. 
B. Recent Judicially Created Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy 
Provision 
Courts in several jurisdictions have recently accepted new argu-
ments to avoid the exclusive remedy rule. For instance, new inter-
pretations of Maryland's exclusivity provision and intentional tort 
exception recently emerged in Federated Department Stores v. Le. 142 
This section first details the court of special appeals opinion in Le, 
then examines the new interpretation of the intent exception adopted 
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in the subsequent appeal. 
Finally, a judicially created exception to the exclusive remedy pro-
vision that has been adopted by jurisdictions outside of Maryland is 
considered. 
1. Classifying Torts: Le v. Federated Department Stores 
In Le v. Federated Department Stores,143 Thach Le, a department 
store salesperson, sued Federated, the corporate parent of his em-
ployer, Bloomingdale's, for false arrest, defamation, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. l44 Bloomingdale's regional chief of 
security, Suzanne Spahr, had accused him of stealing a ca1culator. 145 
Le's complaint alleged that he was wrongly detained in the security 
because they have greater control over workplace hazards than do workers and 
are generally better able to take preventive measures." [d. 
138. See Metz, supra note 8, at 15. 
139. [d. at 14-15. 
140. Maryland monitors occupational safety at the state level. See WORK INJURIES 
IN MARYLAND, supra note 9, at 1. 
141. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) administers the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. 
1990). 
142. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991), aff'g 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989). 
143. 80 Md. App. 89, 560 A.2d 42 (1989). 
144. [d. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42. 
145. [d. 
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office, that he was coerced to sign a statement confessing to the 
theft, and that he was led through the store crying. l46 
Federated filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that 
the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision 
precluded Le from suing Bloomingdale's for tortious acts committed 
by the security officer, a fellow employee. 147 Federated asserted that 
Le could sue at common law only if Spahr was the "alter ego" of 
Federated. 148 Le contended in response that the security officer was 
Bloomingdale's "alter ego" at the time of the incident, and that the 
employee's intentional acts could therefore be attributed to the em-
ployer, allowing Le the option of a common law suit. 149 
The circuit court, relying on the holdings in Schatz v. York 
Steak House Systems, Inc. ISO and Continental Casualty Co. v. Mir-
abile, lSI ruled against Le on the motion for summary judgment, 
finding the alter ego theory inapplicable to Le's case. IS2 Le appealed 
this decision to the court of special appeals, which found that Mr. 
Le had sustained a nonphysical tortious injury. The court held that 
such nonphysical, psychological injuries fell outside the scope of the 
Act's exclusivity provision, thereby permitting a civil tort action.153 
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the court of special 
appeals distinguished Schatz and Mirabile by explaining that in those 
cases the claimants had suffered both psychological and physical 
injuries. ls4 The Workers' Compensation Act provides a remedy in 
such cases for the disability or death of an employee resulting from 
an accidental personal injury. 155 Le, however, had not alleged that 
he suffered a disability resulting from an accidental personal injury. 156 
Rather, he sued on the grounds of false arrest, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. ls7 Thus, the Act did not 
bar Le's recovery for the intentional torts he alleged. 
The court of special appeals relied on Larson's workers' com-
pensation treatise, which asserts that if the "essence of the tort . . . 
is non-physical ... with physical injury being at most added to the 
list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred."ls8 
146. Id. at 92, 560 A.2d at 43. 
147. Id. 
148. See Federated, 324 Md. at 76, 595 A.2d at 1069. 
149. Id. at 77, 595 A.2d at 1069-70. 
150. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. 
151. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
152. Federated, 80 Md. App. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42. 
153. Id. at 92-93, 560 A.2d at 43-44. 
154. Id. at 90-91, 560 A.2d at 42. 
155. Id. at 91, 560 A.2d at 43. 
156. !d. 
157. Id. at 90, 560 A.2d at 42. 
158. Id. at 92, 560 A.2d at 43 (quoting 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION, § 68.34(a) (1976». 
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The court of special appeals thus effectively adopted Larson's view 
that intentional torts that do not entail a physical injury component 
do not invoke the Workers' Compensation Act. Because the Act thus 
provides no remedy, an employee would be permitted to bring a civil 
tort suit to obtain a remedy. 159 
The rationale adopted by Maryland's intermediate appellate court 
in Federated briefly added Marylimd to a list of states adopting 
schemes whereby courts granted exceptions to the exclusive remedy 
rule by classifying torts.16O This is but one of three means by which 
courts have avoided the exclusive remedy rule. The two other methods 
involve redefining the meaning of intent,161 and focusing on whether 
the nature of the employee's injury is of the kind that the workers' 
compensation system was intended to remedy. 162 
Two years after the court of special appeals ruling in Federated, 
the decision, although supported by a different rationale, was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Federated Department 
Store v. Le. 163 The court of appeals rejected a rule that classified 
torts in favor of a new interpretation of Maryland's intentional tort 
exception. 
2. Modifying the Intent Exception: Federated Department Stores 
v. Le 
Rejecting as too narrow the alter ego doctrine developed in 
Schatz v. York Steak House Systems, Inc. 164 and Continental Casualty 
v. Mirabile,165 the court of appeals in Federated Department Stores 
159. [d. at 92-93, 560 A.2d at 43-44. 
160. See, e.g., Moore v. Federated Dep't Stores, 190 N.W.2d 262 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1971) (allowing suit under common law by employee falsely accused and 
imprisoned by her employer for failing to ring up a sale); Mason v. District 
of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1978) (allowing suit under common law by 
employee suing a police officer for mental suffering, humiliation, embarrass-
ment, and anguish); Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(finding false arrest claimant's action not barred); Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 
So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984) (finding claim of false imprisonment by co-employees 
not barred from civil suit); Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 S.W.2d 270 
(Ky. 1981) (finding claim for slander and false imprisonment by co-employee 
not barred from civil court). Cj. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 
P.2d 743 (Cal. 1987) (finding that while suit at common law by employee who 
suffered a stroke resulting in paralysis was barred because physical injuries 
were alleged, the exclusivity rule would not have barred a common law suit if 
complaint had alleged only mental suffering or emotional distress). 
161. See infra notes 181-186 and accompanying text. 
162. See infra notes 187-199 and accompanying text. 
163. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). 
164. See supra notes 84-192 and accompanying text. 
165. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
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v. Le166 shed new light on the relationship between the Workers' 
Compensation Act's exclusivity provision167 and the intentional tort 
exception. 168 Guided by the established principles governing the in-
terpretation of Maryland's Workers' Compensation Act,169 the court 
held that when an employee suffers an injury resulting from a 
deliberate attempt to injure him, the intentional tort exception au-
thorizes a suit against the employer at common law as though the 
workers' compensation statute did not exist. l7O To hold an employer 
liable for an employee's intentional acts committed within the scope 
of employment, tort principles would demand neither that the of-
fending employee be the employer's "alter ego," nor that the em-
ployee's acts be "expressly authorized."171 
In rejecting the alter ego analysis, the court stated that it would 
not restrict the coverage of the intentional tort exception by inserting 
limiting conditions not set forth by the legislature. 172 Furthermore, 
the court noted that in adopting the alter ego doctrine, the court of 
special appeals had relied on cases from states whose workers' 
compensation statutes lacked intentional tort exceptions comparable 
to Maryland's.173 Courts in those states have thus had to adopt 
limited judicial exceptions to their exclusive remedy provisions to 
allow employees access to the civil tort system.174 
The court found that Maryland need not rely on judicially 
created exceptions such as the alter ego doctrine because Maryland's 
statutory exclusive remedy provision can be interpreted as allowing 
for the very same exception. 17s Construing the intentional tort excep-
166. 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). 
167. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 9-509(a) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 101, § 15 (1985»). 
168. Id. § 9-509(d) (1991) [formerly MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 44 (1985»). 
169. Federated, 324 Md. at 80-81, 595 A.2d at 1071-72. The principles are set as 
follows: 
First the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words of the 
Act must be ascertained and given effect; secondly, 'the language of 
a statute is its most natural expositor, and where the language is 
susceptible of sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by any 
extraneous considerations' (Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471); 
thirdly, the construction must be liberal in favor of a private right, 
and construction which imputes an intention to deny valuable rights 
should be avoided; fourthly, statutes are presumed to be passed in 
full recognition of the constitutional rights of the citizen. 
/d. (citing Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 575, 96 A. 764, 765 (1916». 
170. Id. at 85-86, 595 A.2d at 1074. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 85, 595 A.2d at 1074. 
173. Id. at 82, 595 A.2d at 1072. 
174. Id. at 82-83, 595 A.2d at 1072-73. 
175. Id. at 83, 595 A.2d at 1073. 
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tion as providing nothing more than is already embodied in the 
exclusive remedy provision would thus render it superfluous. 176 
The court also dismissed the notion that Maryland's intentional 
tort exception might represent a legislative enactment equivalent to 
other states' judicially created exceptions. 177 The court found that 
this could not be the case because the judicially created exceptions 
address injuries deemed to fall outside the scope of an exclusive 
remedy provision, while Maryland's intentional tort exception "is 
only applicable to injuries encompassed by [the exclusive remedy 
provision]."178 Because Maryland's intentional tort exception grants 
employees the option of accepting workers' compensation benefits 
or of pursuing a common law suit, the court concluded that "it 
makes little sense to equate [the intentional tort exception] with a 
judicially-created exception to compensation coverage." 179 
. This new ruling grants plaintiffs such as Le the option to pursue 
common law tort remedies, which are capable of generating recoveries 
substantially more lucrative than workers' compensation recovery. 
Under common law principles, it could be argued that Spahr, the 
security officer, deliberately intended to injure Le and that Spahr's 
employer would therefore be liable under vicarious liability standards 
set forth in Cox v. Prince George's County.180 Employees in Le's 
position need no longer engage in an alter ego analysis in order to 
hold their employers vicariously liable. 
3. Modifying the Definition of Intent 
Thus, one way to modify the intentional tort exception to the 
exclusivity provision is to make it less narrow by rejecting the alter 
ego analyses courts have used in the past. Other states have taken 
the approach of broadening the definition of "intent." This Article 
has already reviewed cases in which courts have determined that 
"intent" includes willful, wanton or grossly reckless employer be-
havior, in addition to specific intent to cause harm. lSI 
Some commentators have encouraged a different interpretation 
of "intent." One line of reasoning urges that the intent concept 
should mirror the definition set forth in the Restatement (Second) 
oj Torts. 182 The Restatement defines intent as the desire to bring 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 83-84, 595 A.2d at 1073. 
178. Id. at 83, 595 A.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). 
179. Id. at 84, 595 A.2d at 1073. 
180. Id. at 81, 595 A.2d at 1072 (citing Cox v. Prince George's County, 296 Md. 
162, 170-71, 460 A.2d 1038, 1042-43 (1983». 
181. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
182. See, e.g., Kawaler, supra note 43, at 204, wherein the author advocates that 
legislatures adopt a model statute that includes this definition. 
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about the harm or knowledge to a substantial certainty that the harm 
would occur. 183 Most commentators advocating this approach believe 
that a claimant in this circumstance should be allowed to receive 
benefits under the workers' compensation statute and pursue a com-
mon law cause of action,l84 thus eliminating concerns about incon-
sistent pleadings. 18s Additionally, double recovery would not be a 
problem because an employer could be allowed a set-off should the 
plaintiff receive a workers' compensation award. 186 
4. Another Approach: Focusing on the Nature of the Employee's 
. Injury 
Some courts focus on the nature of an employee's injury, making 
exceptions for injuries not contemplated by the workers' compensa-
tion statute. 18? Employees suffering injuries for which the statute fails 
to provide a remedy may pursue a common law remedy.188 This 
inquiry differs from the rationale presented by the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland in Le v. Federated Department Stores. 189 Under 
this approach, the tort itself may be physical or nonphysical; it is 
the result of the injury that may not be compensable. Thus it is not 
surprising that the two approaches sometimes overlap. 
The logic of such overlap is questioned in assertions such as the 
following: 
When one thinks of workmen's compensation, what comes 
to mind is traumatic injury, occupational disease and similar 
physical harms associated with the employment. It is diffi-
cult to imagine, however, what workmen's compensation 
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
184. See, e.g., Kawaler, supra note 43, at 204, 206. 
185. [d. at 207. 
186. Professor Larson suggests a "two fund" recovery system when separate and 
distinct kinds of injury are present. When an employee is injured by a dangerous 
condition in the workplace and the employee continues to work in the same 
condition and sustains further injuries, this "two fund" system should apply. 
The first fund would be governed by workers' compensation and would cover 
the first injury. Tort law would govern the second fund, covering injuries 
sustained after the employer gained knowledge of the first injury and its cause. 
Massey, supra note 104, at 358; see also 2A LARSON, supra note 38, at §§ 
59.30 - 59.34; MARYLAND HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 227-42 (discussing 
Maryland's subsequent injury fund). 
187. See, e.g., Russell v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 666 F.2d 1188 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(rape); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 456 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 
1978) (sex and age discrimination). 
188. See, e.g., Renteria v. County of Orange, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Ct. App. 1978) 
(holding employee's action for intentional infliction of emotional distress not 
barred by workers' compensation exclusive remedy provision). 
189. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
78 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
can have in common with such essentially non-physical torts 
as deceit, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 190 
The overlap occurs because these injuries that stem from nonphysical 
torts are just some of the types of injuries that legislators probably 
never envisioned when they enacted workers' compensation statutes. 
Courts have recognized other injuries that legislators failed to con-
sider when codifying the initial bargain between the employers and 
employees. 
An injury stemming from on-the-job sexual assault is an example 
of the sort of harm never contemplated by legislators. 191 Many states 
cover this injury under their workers' compensation statutes, barring 
civil actions for such injuries as intentional infliction of emotional 
distress by their exclusivity provision. l92 
Similar results occur with regard to injuries that cause sexual 
impairment. 193 Many states do not award permanent disability benefits 
to employees who receive injuries arising out of and in the course 
of employment that render employees impotent or sterile. 194 Workers 
in this situation cannot pursue common law remedies. 195 Even an 
employee incurring a gross facial disfigurement, but whose earning 
capacity was not affected, would be similarly situated. Surely, when 
they negotiated their original bargain, employees did not contemplate 
that these kinds of injuries would remain uncompensated. Some 
courts are sympathetic to these claims, creating exceptions to the 
exclusivity rule for them. l96 
Finally, courts have determined that the physical injury that 
results from emotional distress due to an employer's sex discrimi-
nation should not be brought under workers' compensation. 197 A few 
courts have classified this injury under workers' compensation by 
accepting employer's arguments that any cause of action in which 
injuries are compensable through workers' compensation should be 
barred from civil litigation due to the exclusivity provision. 198 Most 
190. Arthur Larson, Nonphysical Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 12 CAL. W. 
L. REv. 1, 1 (1975). 
191. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. 
192. See, e.g., Holland v. Norristown State Hosp., 584 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1991); Jesse v. Savings Prods., 772 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. 1989). 
193. See generally Dittoe, supra note 13. 
194. [d. at 1207, 1215-16. 
195. [d. 
196. See, e.g., Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Damasiewicz, 187 Md. 474, 
50 A.2d 799 (1947); see also Dittoe, supra note 13, at 1223 (citing several 
California cases). 
197. See supra note 120. 
198. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text. 
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courts, however, believe that this interpretation of the exclusivity 
principle distorts the original purposes of workers' compensation. l99 
Employees probably never imagined that they were giving up their 
right to state discrimination claims when workers' compensation 
legislation was originally negotiated. 
C. Recent Legis/ative Action Regarding the Workers' 
Compensation System 
Absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent, courts are 
hesitant to encroach upon the historic expansive reading of the 
exclusivity provision.200 In instances when courts have done so, leg-
islators have sometimes stepped in and changed what courts have 
done to modify the employer-employee bargain.201 Therefore, it be-
comes important to look at what legislators can do regarding this 
issue.202 Among other actions, the Maryland legislature could consider 
the following two options that other states have addressed or are 
currently considering. 
1. Increasing Awards to Employees in Specific Cases 
Some states require employers to pay additional compensation 
to employees in certain circumstances, such as when an employer is 
grossly negligent, or fails to reveal unsafe working circumstances to 
an employee.203 California's labor code, for example, provides that 
an employee injured by the serious and willful misconduct of his 
employer may have his compensation award increased by fifty per-
cent, up to a maximum of $10,000.204 Furthermore, employers are 
not permitted to insure against having to pay this additional com-
pensation.20s This statutory provision is a compromise between Mar-
yland's current scheme, which allows employers to engage in this 
behavior with no real consequence,206 and what some other jurisdic-
199. See, e.g., Freeman v. Kelvinator, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 999, 1000 (E.D. Mich. 
1979) (discussing exclusivity principle in the context of damages sought for 
race discrimination). 
200. Dittoe, supra note 13, at 1231. One commentator has indicated that legislatures 
rather than courts should resolve public policy issues so that public testimony 
and debate can occur. BaHam, supra note 6, at 120. Legislators, however, are 
slow to act, and are subject to the pressures of interest groups, especially in 
states in which there is a fear that changes in the law could drive employers 
out of the state. See Exceptions, supra note 4, at 1657. 
201. See supra note 72; Kawaler, supra note 43, at 182. 
202. The legislature could take action on any of the issues presented in the preceding 
section. For example, the legislature could change the meaning of "intent." 
203. See supra note 39. 
204. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West 1989). 
205. [d. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 64-75. 
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tions have done, which is to allow the employee to pursue civil 
remedies instead of workers' compensation.207 
2. Replacing the Workers' Compensation System with an 
Integrated System 
California recently passed legislation modifying its state's work-
ers' compensation system.208 This legislation followed an earlier rad-
ical proposal that would have provided benefits to employees regardless 
of whether the condition or injury occurred on the job.209 That 
proposal would have eliminated problems with exclusivity because all 
injuries and illnesses would be handled by the same system. 
Although California ultimately abandoned its fundamental com-
pensation reform, making only modest improvements to its system,21O 
its ideas on workers' compensation reform merit attention. After 
California passed its recent legislation, the California Senate Com-
mittee on Industrial Relations issued a report titled Healthy Worker 
- Healthy Workpiace,iJl in which it considered issues relevant to 
future reform legislation. 
The primary feature of reform articulated by the Senate Com-
mittee on Industrial Relations in Healthy Worker is the merger of 
California's workers' compensation, state disability, and group health 
care insurance into one mandatory health care insurance program 
and one mandatory disability and occupational rehabilitation pro-
gram.212 This program would compensate all the disabilities or injuries 
affecting an employee's ability to work.213 Thus, it would not matter 
whether an employee was actually injured at work. 
The purpose of this proposed system would be to improve care 
for sick and injured workers by eliminating overlapping programs 
and streamlining administration,214 ending what legislators believe to 
be an excess of state time and money spent on efforts to tie disability 
to work and to determine the extent of work-related disabilities. 215 
207. See supra note 72. 
208. See Harry Bernstein, How a Good Workers' Compensation Reform Plan 
Unraveled, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1989, at Sec. IV, p. 1. 
209. California's Radical Proposal, NATION'S Bus., Mar. 1990, at 22. 
210. See Bernstein, supra note 208, at D1. 
211. SENATE COMM. ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, HEALTHY 
WORKER - HEALTHY WORKPLACE: THE PRODUCTIVITY CONNECTION (1990) [here-
inafter HEALTHY WORKER]. 
212. Id. at 40-41. 
213. California'S Radical Proposal, supra note 209, at 22. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. The report states that "[s]ince lifestyles, pre-existing diseases, and related 
disabilities are burdening the workers' compensation system, the remedy is to 
create a truly no-fault insurance system for ail disabilities which occur in the 
laborforce and which temporarily or permanently impair the ability to stay on 
the job." HEALTHY WORKER, supra note 211, at 41; see also California'S 
Radical Proposal, supra note 209, at 22. 
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The insurance program supporting this system would be funded 
through progressive taxation based upon income, while the' cost of 
the premium would be divided between the employer and employees 
at a percentage determined by the state.216 Recall that under workers' 
compensation systems employers are typically fully financially re-
sponsible. 
The law California actually passed is much less dramatic than 
those recommendations articulated in Healthy Worker. The law's 
most significant change is that it nearly doubled the maximum weekly 
benefits paid to employees over a two-year time span.217 The law 
also increased the maximum vocational rehabilitation benefits, in-
creased counseling services, and included provisions that encourage 
employers to make speedy payments.218 The legislation also benefits 
employers. Insurance companies, for example, have agreed to reduce 
employer rates. The law also discourages "doctor shopping" by 
limiting employee options regarding choice of doctors.219 In sum, 
although California's new law eschewed radical change,220 the ideas 
216. California's Radical Proposal, supra note 209, at 22. 
217. Douglas P. Shuit, Governor Tells Plan to Revamp Workers' Comp., L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1989, at Sec. I, p. 1. 
218. [d. 
219. Daniel M. Weintraub, Negotiators Reach Common Ground on Workers' Comp., 
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1989, at Sec. I, p. 1. 
220. In his 1993 State of the State Address, California Governor Pete Wilson called 
for workers' compensation reform. Governor Wilson said: 
We moved closer last year but failed to reform a corrupt, costly 
and terribly unfair system of workers' compensation. People like Mike 
Stennis [a business owner whose restaurants were vandalized during 
the L.A. riots) will tell you that he can survive the L.A. riots, but 
that California's fraud-ridden system of workers' compensation may 
do him in, along with all the workers who depend on him. Let's 
reform this corrupt system. Let's get the job done. 
On New Year's Day, Gayle and I were invited by friends to join 
a family gathering. Their son-in-law, Fred Silva, is a superb craftsmen 
who owns a business that puts down wood flooring. 
After three years as a small employer, Fred has decided to call 
it quits. Though he's never had a claim filed against him, his workers' 
compensation costs have become unaffordable. He'll still take jobs 
he can do by himself. But he just can't afford to be an employer any 
longer. He just can't make it. 
Fred's wife, Donna, told me: "It's just not fair to our employ-
ees," putting into words the pain on her husband's face. 
She's right. It makes no sense that workers' comp-a system 
intended to protect injured workers and their families-is today hurting 
more workers than it helps. It's stealing from them. It's stealing their 
jobs-jobs we all need both to put food on the table, and to take 
pride and dignity from doing something that has value each day. 
It's just not fair. 
Last year, the Council on California Competitiveness accused 
82 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 21 
presented in Healthy Worker are important for states that are con-
sidering effecting more systemic changes in their workers' compen-
sation programs. 
IV. RENEGOTIATING THE BARGAIN: AN EVALUATION 
OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
Maryland has several options for revising its present workers' 
. compensation scheme. This section evaluates the judicially created 
exceptions - classifying torts, modifying the intent exception, and 
focusing on the nature of the employee's injury - and possible 
legislative changes - increasing awards to employees in specific cases 
and replacing the workers' compensation with a brand new system. 
This section assumes that the bargain between employers and em-
ployees must change to promote workplace safety, but also that the 
renegotiation must not be too drastic in light of the legislature's 
reluctance to impose additional costs on Maryland businesses. 
A. Classifying Torts 
Distinguishing between physical and nonphysical injuries would 
provide employees greater access to the civil court system. Employees 
who select a civil action and choose unsophisticated attorneys, how-
ever, may find themselves victims of improperly drafted pleadings. 
An attorney whose client had suffered a nonphysical injury might 
add a physical injury count to bolster the employee's claim and, as 
a result, unknowingly place the claim squarely within the ambit of 
the workers' compensation system. Conversely, a claimant might feel 
compelled to disregard physical injuries and focus instead on more 
temporary or intangible injuries, such as those resulting from false 
imprisonment, in order to avoid falling under the workers' compen-
sation system. 
A great dilemma arises in the case of an employee who is raped. 
Such an incident gives rise to claims of false imprisonment and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. An employee arguing that 
the injury is primarily nonphysical is likely to face an employer who 
will argue that the physical aspect of rape cannot be glossed over in 
order to engage in a civil action. Additionally, as the workers' 
compensation system starts to address more fully the issue of com-
state and local governments of becoming a "job-killing-machine." 
John Vasconcellos, you and your ADEPT report reached the same 
conclusions. Those of you on both sides of the aisle seem to agree 
on the urgent need for a cure. What remains is for us to take action 
and to get the job done. 
Text 0/ Governor's Address, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1993, at A20. 
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pensating employees for mental or psychological injuries, the ration-
ale behind classifying torts erodes. Maryland's highest court was thus 
wise to create a different approach to avoid the exclusivity provision 
in Federated Department Stores v. Le.221 
B. Modifying the Intentional Tort Exception 
Maryland's decision to broaden an employee's option to choose 
a common law action by rejecting the alter ego theory will allow 
plaintiffs a chance to procure a more appropriate remedy through 
civil actions. The court of appeals decision in Federated Department 
Stores v. Le will provide a more just result for plaintiffs like those 
in Federated,222 Schatz,2'];3 and Mirabile. 224 In the future, the court 
should modify the intent exception to refrain from shielding employ-
ers who are grossly negligent and who fail to promote safe working 
conditions. Employers presently have few incentives to promote safety. 
Regulatory supervision and unionism have declined, leaving fewer 
workplace watchdogs. The uncaring employer is able to simply write 
off the increased workers' compensation insurance premiums that 
result from unsafe working conditions as a cost of doing business. 
This alternative for renegotiating the bargain is very promising. 
Maryland courts have already demonstrated a willingness to pursue 
this alternative. Courts in the future should enhance the rule-based 
analysis outlined in Federated by adding policy-based arguments that 
explicitly acknowledge the need to rebalance employer and employee 
rights. 
C. Focusing on the Nature oj the Employee's Injury 
This exception to the exclusive remedy principle makes sense on 
one level quite simply because it seems inherently unfair for employees 
to assume the risk of injuries like sexual assault or impotence as part 
of the quid pro quo with the employer. This exception is problematic, 
however, because it is difficult to draw the line between what will 
be considered a "normal" and "abnormal" consequence of working. 
The courts or the legislature could create more certainty for employers 
and employees alike, yet still achieve the same result, by keeping 
what makes sense in the workers' compensation system and by 
modifying the remaining sections. 
D. Increasing A wards to Employees in Specific Cases 
The alternative of increasing awards to employees in specific 
kinds of cases holds promise. Its primary strength is that it gives 
221. See supra notes 166-180 and accompanying text. 
222. [d. 
223. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 
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employees additional compensation in circumstances in which the 
employer's behavior was especially reprehensible. Allowing increased 
awards would provide an incentive to employers to behave in ways 
that would prevent them from incurring such additional expense. 
Employers would be more reluctant to engage in intentional or grossly 
negligent acts, resulting in increased workplace safety. 
This alternative benefits employers because it reduces employees' 
eagerness to pursue common law remedies. Additionally, employers 
benefit from the certainty of knowing the economic consequences of 
certain types of conduct in advance, rather than gambling on jury 
verdicts in civil cases. This alternative seems more practical than the 
present scheme in light of the realities of the business world and, as 
such, deserves serious consideration. 
E. Replacing the Workers' Compensation System with an 
Integrated System 
The ideas presented in Healthy Worker - Healthy Workplace 
are also worth considering. Despite the unlikelihood that Maryland's 
workers' compensation system will undergo radical reform, Califor-
nia's ideas are relevant in light of Maryland's willingness to narrow 
the exclusivity rule, as evidenced by Federated Department Stores v. 
Le. 
An integrated workers' compensation system providing benefits 
to employees regardless of whether they were injured at work would 
reduce litigation and benefit a greater number of injured citizens. 
Depending upon the benefit levels in this kind of plan, this alternative 
could protect employees by providing incentives to promote work-
place safety. Under an integrated system, employers could also ben-
efit. As California's suggestions indicate, employers could benefit by 
paying reduced insurance premiums and less in attorneys' fees since 
employees would no longer need to litigate to avoid a flawed system. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The exclusivity provision of the Maryland Workers' Compen-
sation Act has been·a blessing to employers by limiting their economic 
liability. Maryland employees in search of safety in the workplace 
are, however, understandably discouraged. when they see the disin-
centives the Maryland workers' compensation law provides to em-
ployers. Employers have the luxury of knowing that employees will 
receive low benefits from workplace injuries, and that only on rare 
occasions will the employee succeed in a common law tort suit. 
The court of appeals implicitly acknowledged the need for a 
change through their holding in Federated Department Stores v. Le. 
The bargain upon which workers' compensation laws are based is 
out of step with the realities of today's marketplace. Maryland's 
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highest court moved in a positive direction when it questioned past 
Maryland cases that had unfairly burdened employees. By reinter-
preting the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision, the 
court has moved to adjust the balance between employee and em-
ployer rights. For plaintiffs like Thach Le, the new ruling enhances 
the ability to sue under common law principles. For many other 
employees, the courts or the legislature must go further to adjust the 
balance. This Article has outlined several alternatives for change. 
Regardless of which alternative is ultimately selected, debate on the 
issue promises to be intense. 
